Systematic Theology: God's Purposes by Charles G. Finney Pg4

The Purposes of God
Charles G. Finney. "Systematic Theology"
Lecture 77 (1851) - Page 4 of 5 pages
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Part V
God's revealed will is never inconsistent with His secret purposes

V-1a It has been common to represent sin as the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the greatest good, in such a sense, that...

Upon the whole God secretly, but really, prefers sin to holiness in every case where it exists
While God has forbidden sin under all circumstances, upon pain of eternal death, yet, because it is the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the greatest good, God really prefers its existence to holiness in every instance in which it exists.

It has been said that, because sin exists, it is very evident that God did not prevent it. But He could and would prevent it, if He did not upon the whole prefer it to holiness, in the circumstances in which it occurs.
V-1b Sin's existence, then, it has been said, is proof conclusive that God secretly prefers its existence to holiness, in every case in which it occurs.

But this is a non sequitur. It does not follow from the existence of sin, that God prefers sin to holiness in the circumstances in which it occurs; but it may be, that He only prefers sin to such a change of circumstances as would prevent it.

Suppose I require my son to do a certain thing. I know that He will do it, if I remain at home and see to it. But I know also, that if I go from home He will not do it. Now I might prefer that He should do as I command, and consider His disobedience as a great evil; still I might regard it as a less evil than for me to remain at home, and keep my eye upon Him.

V-1c I might have just reasons for supposing that, under the circumstances, a greater good could be secured upon the whole by my going from home, although my son's disobedience might be the consequence, than by remaining at home, and preventing his disobedience. Benevolence therefore might require me to go.

But should my son infer from my leaving Him, under these circumstances, that I really, though secretly, preferred his disobedience to His obedience? Under the identical circumstances in which I gave the command, would his inference be legitimate?

No, indeed. All that he could justly infer from my leaving him, with the knowledge that he would disobey me if I did, would be, that although I regarded his disobedience as a great evil, yet I regarded remaining at home as a greater evil. V-1d Just so, it may be when sin exists. God is sincere in prohibiting sin. He would greatly prefer that it should not exist. All that can be justly inferred from God's not preventing sin is, that, although He regards its existence as a great and real evil, yet upon the whole He regards it as a less evil, than would result from so great a change in the administration of His government as would prevent it.

God is therefore entirely and infinitely sincere in requiring obedience, and in prohibiting disobedience, and His secret purpose is in strict keeping with His revealed will. Were the moral law universally obeyed, under the circumstances in which all moral agents exist, no one can say, that this would not be better for the universe, and more pleasing to God than disobedience is in the same circumstances.

V-1e Nor is it fair to infer, that upon the whole, God must prefer sin to holiness, where it occurs, from the fact that He does not prevent it.

As has been said, all that can justly be inferred from His not preventing it is, that under the circumstances He prefers not sin to holiness, but prefers to suffer the agent to sin and take the consequences, rather than introduce such changes in the policy and administration of His government as would prevent it.

Or it may be said, that the present system is the best that infinite wisdom could devise and execute, not because of sin, but in spite of it, and notwithstanding sin is a real though incidental evil.
V-2a It is a palpable contradiction and an absurdity to affirm, that any being can sin, intending thereby to promote the greatest good. This will appear if we consider that...

It is admitted on all hands, that benevolence is virtue.
Benevolence consists in willing good, or the highest good of being as an end.
It is duty to will both the end and the necessary means to promote it.
Right and benevolence are always at one, that is, that which is benevolent must always be right, and can in no case be wrong.
Consequently it can never be sin to choose the highest good of being, with all the necessary occasions, conditions, and means of promoting it.

V-2b It is impossible therefore for a being to sin, or to consent to sin, as an occasion, condition, or means, or designing thereby to promote the highest good of being; for this design would be virtue, and not sin.

Whether all virtue consist in benevolence, or not, still it must be admitted, that all forms of virtue must be consistent with benevolence, unless it be admitted, that there can be a law of right inconsistent with, and opposed to, the law of benevolence.
But this would be to admit, that two moral laws might be opposed to each other; which would be to admit, that a moral agent might be under an obligation to obey two opposing laws at the same time, which is a contradiction.
Thus it appears, that there can be no law of right opposed to, or separate from, the law of benevolence.

V-2c Benevolence and right must then always be as one. If this be so, it follows, that whatever benevolence demands, cannot be wrong, but must be right.

But the law of benevolence demands, not only the choice of the highest good of being as an end, but also demands the choice of all the known necessary occasions, conditions, and means with a design to promote that end.
It is naturally impossible to sin, in using means designed and known to be necessary to the promotion of the end of benevolence.
It is therefore naturally impossible to do evil, or to sin that good may come, or with the design to promote good thereby.

V-2d To deny this, and to maintain, that a man can possibly sin in intending to promote the highest good of being, and in fulfilling the necessary conditions, and in using what He regards as the necessary means, is, I say again, to hold, that there is a law of right separate from, and opposed to, the law of benevolence...

which is, as before said, to hold, that two moral laws are opposed to each other, and require opposite courses of conduct in the same agent at the same time
which is to hold, that there are two opposing laws of nature and of God at the same time
which is to hold, that a moral agent may justly be required, on pain of eternal death, to choose, design, and act in opposite directions at the same time

which is to hold, that it is His duty to sin and not to sin at the same time
which is to hold, that a moral agent might sin in doing His duty, or in obeying moral law.

V-3 Let those who hold that right and benevolence may be opposed to each other, and that a moral agent can sin with a benevolent intention, see what their doctrine amounts to, and get out of the absurdity as best they can.

The fact is, if willing the highest good of being is always virtuous, it must always be right to will all the necessary occasions, conditions, and means to that end.

It is therefore a contradiction to say that sin can be among the necessary and intended occasions, conditions, and means; that is, that any one could sin intending thereby to promote the highest good.

V-4 But it is not pretended by those who hold this dogma, that sin sustains to the highest good the same relations that holiness does.

V-4a Holiness has a natural tendency to promote the highest good; but the supposition now under consideration is, that sin is hateful in itself, and that it therefore must dissatisfy and disgust all moral agents, and that its natural tendency is to defeat the end of moral government, and to prevent rather than promote the highest good; but that God foresees that, notwithstanding its intrinsically odious and injurious nature, He can so overrule it as to make it the condition, occasion, or instrument of the highest good of himself and of His universe, and that for this reason He really upon the whole is pleased that it should occur, and prefers its existence, in every instance in which it does exist, to holiness in its stead.

V-4b The supposition is, that sin is in its own nature infinitely odious and abominable to God, and perfectly odious to all holy moral agents, yet it is the occasion of calling into development and exercise such emotions and feelings in God and in holy beings, and such modifications of benevolence, as do really more than compensate for all the disgust and painful emotions that result to holy beings, and for all the remorse, agony, despair, and endless suffering, that result to sinners.

V-4c It is not supposed by any one that I know of, that sin naturally tends to promote the highest good at all, but only that God can, and does, so overrule and counteract its natural tendency, as to make it the occasion or condition of a greater good, than holiness would be in its stead. Now in reply to this, I would say, that I pretend not to determine to what extent God can, and will, overrule and counteract the naturally evil and injurious tendency of sin.
It surely is enough to say, that God prohibits it, and that it is impossible for creatures to know that

It surely is enough to say, that God prohibits it, and that it is impossible for creatures to know that sin is the necessary occasion, or condition, or means of the highest good.

V-5 "If sin is known by God to be the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the highest good of himself and of the universe, whatever it may be in itself, yet viewed in its relations, it must be regarded by Him as of infinite value, since it is the indispensable condition of infinite good."

According to this theory, sin in every instance in which it exists, is and must be regarded by God as of infinitely greater value than holiness would be in its stead. He must then, upon the whole, have infinite complacency in it.

V-5 But this leads me to attend to the principal arguments by which it is supposed this theory is maintained.

V-5a(1) It has been said by some that the highest good of the universe of moral agents is conditioned upon the revelation of the attributes and character of God to them; that but for sin these attributes, at least some of them, could never have been revealed, inasmuch as without sin there would have been no occasion for their display or manifestation; that neither justice nor mercy, nor forbearance, nor self-denial, nor meekness, could have found the occasions of their exercise or manifestation, had sin never existed.

V-5a(2) To this I reply that sin has indeed furnished the occasion for a glorious manifestation of the moral perfections of God.

From this we see that God's perfections enable Him greatly to overrule sin, and to bring good out of evil but from this we are not authorized to infer, that God could not have revealed these attributes to His creatures without the existence of sin.
Nor can we say, that these revelations would have been necessary to the highest perfection and happiness of the universe, had all moral agents perfectly and uniformly obeyed.
When we consider what the moral attributes of God are, it is easy to see that there may be myriads of moral attributes in God of which no creature has, or ever will have, any knowledge; and the knowledge of which is not at all essential to the highest perfection and happiness of the universe of creatures.

V-5a(3) God's moral attributes are only His benevolence, existing and contemplated in its various relations to the universe of beings.

Benevolence in any being must possess as many attributes as there are possible relations under which it can be contemplated, and should their occasions arise, these attributes would stand forth in exercise.
It is not at all probable, that all of the attributes of benevolence, either in the Creator or in creatures, have yet found the occasions of their exercise, nor, perhaps, will they ever.
As new occasions rise to all eternity, benevolence will develop new and striking attributes, and manifest itself under endless forms and varieties of loveliness. There can be no such thing as exhausting its capabilities of development.

V-5a(4) In God benevolence is infinite. Creatures can never know all its attributes, nor approach any nearer to knowing all of them than they now are. For it is infinite, and there can be no end to its capabilities of developing in exercise new forms of beauty and loveliness.

V-5a(5) It is true, that God has taken occasion to show forth the glory of His benevolence through the existence of sin. He has seized the occasion, though mournful in itself, to manifest some of the attributes of His benevolence by the exercise of them.

V-5a(6) It is also true, that we cannot know how or by what means God could have revealed these attributes, if sin had not existed; and it is also true, that we cannot know that such a revelation was impossible without the existence of sin; nor that, but for sin, the revelation would have been necessary to the highest good of the universe.
V-5a(7) God forbids sin, and requires universal holiness. He must be sincere in this. But sin exists.

Shall we say that He secretly chooses that it should, and really, though secretly, prefers its existence to holiness, in the circumstances in which it occurs?
Or shall we assume, that it is an evil, that God regards it as such, but that He cannot wisely prevent it; that is, to prevent it would introduce a still greater evil?

V-5a(8) It is an evil, and a great evil, but still the less of two evils; that is, to suffer it to occur, under the circumstances, is a less evil than such a change of circumstances, as would prevent it, would be. This is all we can justly infer from its existence. This leaves the sincerity of God unimpeached, and sustains His consistency, and the consistency and integrity of His law. The opposite supposition represents God and the law as infinitely deceitful.

V-5b It has been said by some that the Bible sustains the supposition, that sin is the necessary means of the highest good.

I trust the passages that have been quoted, disprove this saying.

V-5c(1) It has been said by some that to represent sin as not the means of the highest good, and God as unable to prevent it, is to represent God as unable to accomplish all His will; whereas He says, He will do all His pleasure, and that nothing is too hard for Him.

V-5c(2) To this I reply: God pleases to do only what is naturally possible, and He is well pleased to do that and nothing more. This He is able to do. This He will do. This He does. This is all He claims to be able to do; and this is all, that in fact infinite wisdom and power can do. V-5d(1) It has been said by some that if sin is an evil, and God can neither prevent nor overrule it, so as to make it a means of greater good than could be secured without it, He must be unhappy in view of this fact, because He cannot prevent it, and secure a higher good without it.

V-5d(2) To this I reply: God neither desires nor wills to perform natural impossibilities. God is a reasonable being, and does not aim at nor desire impossibilities. He is well content to do as well as, in the nature of the case, is possible, and has no unreasonable regrets because He is not more than infinite, and that He cannot accomplish what is impossible to infinity itself. His good pleasure is, to secure all the good that is possible to infinity: with this He is infinitely well pleased.

V-6 Again: does not the objection, that the view of the subject here presented limits the divine power, lie with all its force against those who make this objection?

To hold that sin is the necessary means or condition of the highest good, is to hold that God was unable to promote the highest good without resorting to such vile means as sin.
Sin is an abomination in itself; and do not they, as really and as much limit the power of God, who maintain His inability to promote the highest good without it, as they do who hold, that He could not wisely so interfere with the free actions of moral agents as to prevent it?

V-6(1) Sin exists. God abhors it. How is its existence to be accounted for? I suppose it to be an evil unavoidably incidental to that system of moral
government which, notwithstanding the evil, was upon the whole the best that could be adopted.

V-6(2) Others suppose, that sin is the necessary means or condition of the greatest good; and account for its existence in this way:--that is, they suppose that God admits or permits its existence as a necessary occasion, condition, or means of the highest good; that He was not able to secure the highest good without it.

V-7 The two explanations of the admitted fact that sin exists, differ in this...

V-7(1) One theory holds that sin is the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the highest good; and that God actually, upon the whole, prefers the existence of sin to holiness, in every instance in which it exists; because, in those circumstances, it is a condition or means of greater good than could

have been secured by holiness in its stead. This theory represents God as unable to secure His end by other means, or upon other conditions, than sin.

V-7(2) The other theory holds, that God really prefers holiness to sin in every instance in which it occurs; that He regards sin as an evil, but that while He regards it as an evil, He suffers its existence as a less evil than such a change in the administration of His government as would prevent it, would be.

V-7(3) Both theories must admit, that in some sense God could not wisely prevent it. Explain the fact of its existence as you will, it must be admitted, that in some sense God was not able to prevent it, and secure His end.

V-8 If it be said, that God could neither wisely prevent sin, nor so overrule it as to make it the means or condition of the highest good, He must be rendered unhappy by its existence; I reply, that this must be equally true upon the other hypothesis.

V-8(1) Sin is hateful, and its consequences are a great evil. These consequences will be eternal and indefinitely great. God must disapprove these consequences.

V-8(2) If sin is the necessary condition or means of the greatest good, must not God lament that He cannot secure the good without a resort to such loathsome, and such horrible means?

V-9 If God's inability wisely to prevent sin will interfere with and diminish His happiness, must not the same be true of His inability to secure the highest good, without such means as will prove the eternal destruction of millions?

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The Purposes of God Charles G. Finney. "Systematic Theology" Lecture 77 (1851) - Page 4 of 5 pages Navigation
Part V God's revealed will is never inconsistent with His secret purposes
V-1a It has been common to represent sin as the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the greatest good, in such a sense, that... Upon the whole God secretly, but really, prefers sin to holiness in every case where it exists While God has forbidden sin under all circumstances, upon pain of eternal death, yet, because it is the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the greatest good, God really prefers its existence to holiness in every instance in which it exists. It has been said that, because sin exists, it is very evident that God did not prevent it. But He could and would prevent it, if He did not upon the whole prefer it to holiness, in the circumstances in which it occurs.		V-1b Sin's existence, then, it has been said, is proof conclusive that God secretly prefers its existence to holiness, in every case in which it occurs. But this is a non sequitur. It does not follow from the existence of sin, that God prefers sin to holiness in the circumstances in which it occurs; but it may be, that He only prefers sin to such a change of circumstances as would prevent it. Suppose I require my son to do a certain thing. I know that He will do it, if I remain at home and see to it. But I know also, that if I go from home He will not do it. Now I might prefer that He should do as I command, and consider His disobedience as a great evil; still I might regard it as a less evil than for me to remain at home, and keep my eye upon Him.
V-1c I might have just reasons for supposing that, under the circumstances, a greater good could be secured upon the whole by my going from home, although my son's disobedience might be the consequence, than by remaining at home, and preventing his disobedience. Benevolence therefore might require me to go. But should my son infer from my leaving Him, under these circumstances, that I really, though secretly, preferred his disobedience to His obedience? Under the identical circumstances in which I gave the command, would his inference be legitimate? No, indeed. All that he could justly infer from my leaving him, with the knowledge that he would disobey me if I did, would be, that although I regarded his disobedience as a great evil, yet I regarded remaining at home as a greater evil.		V-1d Just so, it may be when sin exists. God is sincere in prohibiting sin. He would greatly prefer that it should not exist. All that can be justly inferred from God's not preventing sin is, that, although He regards its existence as a great and real evil, yet upon the whole He regards it as a less evil, than would result from so great a change in the administration of His government as would prevent it. God is therefore entirely and infinitely sincere in requiring obedience, and in prohibiting disobedience, and His secret purpose is in strict keeping with His revealed will. Were the moral law universally obeyed, under the circumstances in which all moral agents exist, no one can say, that this would not be better for the universe, and more pleasing to God than disobedience is in the same circumstances.
V-1e Nor is it fair to infer, that upon the whole, God must prefer sin to holiness, where it occurs, from the fact that He does not prevent it. As has been said, all that can justly be inferred from His not preventing it is, that under the circumstances He prefers not sin to holiness, but prefers to suffer the agent to sin and take the consequences, rather than introduce such changes in the policy and administration of His government as would prevent it. Or it may be said, that the present system is the best that infinite wisdom could devise and execute, not because of sin, but in spite of it, and notwithstanding sin is a real though incidental evil.		V-2a It is a palpable contradiction and an absurdity to affirm, that any being can sin, intending thereby to promote the greatest good. This will appear if we consider that... It is admitted on all hands, that benevolence is virtue. Benevolence consists in willing good, or the highest good of being as an end. It is duty to will both the end and the necessary means to promote it. Right and benevolence are always at one, that is, that which is benevolent must always be right, and can in no case be wrong. Consequently it can never be sin to choose the highest good of being, with all the necessary occasions, conditions, and means of promoting it.
V-2b It is impossible therefore for a being to sin, or to consent to sin, as an occasion, condition, or means, or designing thereby to promote the highest good of being; for this design would be virtue, and not sin. Whether all virtue consist in benevolence, or not, still it must be admitted, that all forms of virtue must be consistent with benevolence, unless it be admitted, that there can be a law of right inconsistent with, and opposed to, the law of benevolence. But this would be to admit, that two moral laws might be opposed to each other; which would be to admit, that a moral agent might be under an obligation to obey two opposing laws at the same time, which is a contradiction. Thus it appears, that there can be no law of right opposed to, or separate from, the law of benevolence.		V-2c Benevolence and right must then always be as one. If this be so, it follows, that whatever benevolence demands, cannot be wrong, but must be right. But the law of benevolence demands, not only the choice of the highest good of being as an end, but also demands the choice of all the known necessary occasions, conditions, and means with a design to promote that end. It is naturally impossible to sin, in using means designed and known to be necessary to the promotion of the end of benevolence. It is therefore naturally impossible to do evil, or to sin that good may come, or with the design to promote good thereby.
V-2d To deny this, and to maintain, that a man can possibly sin in intending to promote the highest good of being, and in fulfilling the necessary conditions, and in using what He regards as the necessary means, is, I say again, to hold, that there is a law of right separate from, and opposed to, the law of benevolence... which is, as before said, to hold, that two moral laws are opposed to each other, and require opposite courses of conduct in the same agent at the same time which is to hold, that there are two opposing laws of nature and of God at the same time which is to hold, that a moral agent may justly be required, on pain of eternal death, to choose, design, and act in opposite directions at the same time		which is to hold, that it is His duty to sin and not to sin at the same time which is to hold, that a moral agent might sin in doing His duty, or in obeying moral law. V-3 Let those who hold that right and benevolence may be opposed to each other, and that a moral agent can sin with a benevolent intention, see what their doctrine amounts to, and get out of the absurdity as best they can. The fact is, if willing the highest good of being is always virtuous, it must always be right to will all the necessary occasions, conditions, and means to that end. It is therefore a contradiction to say that sin can be among the necessary and intended occasions, conditions, and means; that is, that any one could sin intending thereby to promote the highest good.
V-4 But it is not pretended by those who hold this dogma, that sin sustains to the highest good the same relations that holiness does. V-4a Holiness has a natural tendency to promote the highest good; but the supposition now under consideration is, that sin is hateful in itself, and that it therefore must dissatisfy and disgust all moral agents, and that its natural tendency is to defeat the end of moral government, and to prevent rather than promote the highest good; but that God foresees that, notwithstanding its intrinsically odious and injurious nature, He can so overrule it as to make it the condition, occasion, or instrument of the highest good of himself and of His universe, and that for this reason He really upon the whole is pleased that it should occur, and prefers its existence, in every instance in which it does exist, to holiness in its stead. V-4b The supposition is, that sin is in its own nature infinitely odious and abominable to God,		and perfectly odious to all holy moral agents, yet it is the occasion of calling into development and exercise such emotions and feelings in God and in holy beings, and such modifications of benevolence, as do really more than compensate for all the disgust and painful emotions that result to holy beings, and for all the remorse, agony, despair, and endless suffering, that result to sinners. V-4c It is not supposed by any one that I know of, that sin naturally tends to promote the highest good at all, but only that God can, and does, so overrule and counteract its natural tendency, as to make it the occasion or condition of a greater good, than holiness would be in its stead. Now in reply to this, I would say, that I pretend not to determine to what extent God can, and will, overrule and counteract the naturally evil and injurious tendency of sin. It surely is enough to say, that God prohibits it, and that it is impossible for creatures to know that
It surely is enough to say, that God prohibits it, and that it is impossible for creatures to know that sin is the necessary occasion, or condition, or means of the highest good. V-5 "If sin is known by God to be the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the highest good of himself and of the universe, whatever it may be in itself, yet viewed in its relations, it must be regarded by Him as of infinite value, since it is the indispensable condition of infinite good." According to this theory, sin in every instance in which it exists, is and must be regarded by God as of infinitely greater value than holiness would be in its stead. He must then, upon the whole, have infinite complacency in it.		V-5 But this leads me to attend to the principal arguments by which it is supposed this theory is maintained. V-5a(1) It has been said by some that the highest good of the universe of moral agents is conditioned upon the revelation of the attributes and character of God to them; that but for sin these attributes, at least some of them, could never have been revealed, inasmuch as without sin there would have been no occasion for their display or manifestation; that neither justice nor mercy, nor forbearance, nor self-denial, nor meekness, could have found the occasions of their exercise or manifestation, had sin never existed.
V-5a(2) To this I reply that sin has indeed furnished the occasion for a glorious manifestation of the moral perfections of God. From this we see that God's perfections enable Him greatly to overrule sin, and to bring good out of evil but from this we are not authorized to infer, that God could not have revealed these attributes to His creatures without the existence of sin. Nor can we say, that these revelations would have been necessary to the highest perfection and happiness of the universe, had all moral agents perfectly and uniformly obeyed. When we consider what the moral attributes of God are, it is easy to see that there may be myriads of moral attributes in God of which no creature has, or ever will have, any knowledge; and the knowledge of which is not at all essential to the highest perfection and happiness of the universe of creatures.		V-5a(3) God's moral attributes are only His benevolence, existing and contemplated in its various relations to the universe of beings. Benevolence in any being must possess as many attributes as there are possible relations under which it can be contemplated, and should their occasions arise, these attributes would stand forth in exercise. It is not at all probable, that all of the attributes of benevolence, either in the Creator or in creatures, have yet found the occasions of their exercise, nor, perhaps, will they ever. As new occasions rise to all eternity, benevolence will develop new and striking attributes, and manifest itself under endless forms and varieties of loveliness. There can be no such thing as exhausting its capabilities of development.
V-5a(4) In God benevolence is infinite. Creatures can never know all its attributes, nor approach any nearer to knowing all of them than they now are. For it is infinite, and there can be no end to its capabilities of developing in exercise new forms of beauty and loveliness. V-5a(5) It is true, that God has taken occasion to show forth the glory of His benevolence through the existence of sin. He has seized the occasion, though mournful in itself, to manifest some of the attributes of His benevolence by the exercise of them. V-5a(6) It is also true, that we cannot know how or by what means God could have revealed these attributes, if sin had not existed; and it is also true, that we cannot know that such a revelation was impossible without the existence of sin; nor that, but for sin, the revelation would have been necessary to the highest good of the universe.		V-5a(7) God forbids sin, and requires universal holiness. He must be sincere in this. But sin exists. Shall we say that He secretly chooses that it should, and really, though secretly, prefers its existence to holiness, in the circumstances in which it occurs? Or shall we assume, that it is an evil, that God regards it as such, but that He cannot wisely prevent it; that is, to prevent it would introduce a still greater evil? V-5a(8) It is an evil, and a great evil, but still the less of two evils; that is, to suffer it to occur, under the circumstances, is a less evil than such a change of circumstances, as would prevent it, would be. This is all we can justly infer from its existence. This leaves the sincerity of God unimpeached, and sustains His consistency, and the consistency and integrity of His law. The opposite supposition represents God and the law as infinitely deceitful.
V-5b It has been said by some that the Bible sustains the supposition, that sin is the necessary means of the highest good. I trust the passages that have been quoted, disprove this saying. V-5c(1) It has been said by some that to represent sin as not the means of the highest good, and God as unable to prevent it, is to represent God as unable to accomplish all His will; whereas He says, He will do all His pleasure, and that nothing is too hard for Him. V-5c(2) To this I reply: God pleases to do only what is naturally possible, and He is well pleased to do that and nothing more. This He is able to do. This He will do. This He does. This is all He claims to be able to do; and this is all, that in fact infinite wisdom and power can do.		V-5d(1) It has been said by some that if sin is an evil, and God can neither prevent nor overrule it, so as to make it a means of greater good than could be secured without it, He must be unhappy in view of this fact, because He cannot prevent it, and secure a higher good without it. V-5d(2) To this I reply: God neither desires nor wills to perform natural impossibilities. God is a reasonable being, and does not aim at nor desire impossibilities. He is well content to do as well as, in the nature of the case, is possible, and has no unreasonable regrets because He is not more than infinite, and that He cannot accomplish what is impossible to infinity itself. His good pleasure is, to secure all the good that is possible to infinity: with this He is infinitely well pleased.
V-6 Again: does not the objection, that the view of the subject here presented limits the divine power, lie with all its force against those who make this objection? To hold that sin is the necessary means or condition of the highest good, is to hold that God was unable to promote the highest good without resorting to such vile means as sin. Sin is an abomination in itself; and do not they, as really and as much limit the power of God, who maintain His inability to promote the highest good without it, as they do who hold, that He could not wisely so interfere with the free actions of moral agents as to prevent it? V-6(1) Sin exists. God abhors it. How is its existence to be accounted for? I suppose it to be an evil unavoidably incidental to that system of moral		government which, notwithstanding the evil, was upon the whole the best that could be adopted. V-6(2) Others suppose, that sin is the necessary means or condition of the greatest good; and account for its existence in this way:--that is, they suppose that God admits or permits its existence as a necessary occasion, condition, or means of the highest good; that He was not able to secure the highest good without it. V-7 The two explanations of the admitted fact that sin exists, differ in this... V-7(1) One theory holds that sin is the necessary occasion, condition, or means of the highest good; and that God actually, upon the whole, prefers the existence of sin to holiness, in every instance in which it exists; because, in those circumstances, it is a condition or means of greater good than could
have been secured by holiness in its stead. This theory represents God as unable to secure His end by other means, or upon other conditions, than sin. V-7(2) The other theory holds, that God really prefers holiness to sin in every instance in which it occurs; that He regards sin as an evil, but that while He regards it as an evil, He suffers its existence as a less evil than such a change in the administration of His government as would prevent it, would be. V-7(3) Both theories must admit, that in some sense God could not wisely prevent it. Explain the fact of its existence as you will, it must be admitted, that in some sense God was not able to prevent it, and secure His end. V-8 If it be said, that God could neither wisely prevent sin, nor so overrule it as to make it the means or		condition of the highest good, He must be rendered unhappy by its existence; I reply, that this must be equally true upon the other hypothesis. V-8(1) Sin is hateful, and its consequences are a great evil. These consequences will be eternal and indefinitely great. God must disapprove these consequences. V-8(2) If sin is the necessary condition or means of the greatest good, must not God lament that He cannot secure the good without a resort to such loathsome, and such horrible means? V-9 If God's inability wisely to prevent sin will interfere with and diminish His happiness, must not the same be true of His inability to secure the highest good, without such means as will prove the eternal destruction of millions?